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FOREWORD
MARY M. DEVLIN

Psychologists (at least popular psychologists) tell us that role conflict
creates stress, but that stress can have positive effects-on healthy individuals.
Are there 800,000 role-conflicted, stressed-out lawyers in the United States?
Probably not. But there are too many creating unhappiness for their clients, for
other lawyers, and for judges.
The legal profession in the United States did not divide itself into the
English system of barristers and solicitors.' Instead, admission to the Bar is
admission to all forms of practice-within the bounds of competence. The ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly recognize the existence of

M.A., M.A.L.S., J.D. (Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law);
Regulation Counsel, American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility.
1. In the colonial era, 'a few jurisdictions sought to set up grades after the English system
[,b]ut these attempts came to naught." ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO
MODERN TIMEs 163 (1953). In 1990, to address problems caused by the barrister/solicitor divided
system, including disadvantagesto clients, Parliament enacted proposals to allow solicitors to appear
as advocates in higher courts-to the dismay of barristers. See Andrew Walker, A Right of
Audience: Solicitors, Barristers,and the Future of England'sDivided Profession, 5 RESEARCHING
LAw: AN ABF UPDATE, Winter 1994, at 2.
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different roles within the American legal profession.2 For example, the
lawyer's particular responsibilities in the role of "Counselor" are specified in
one section of the Model Rules,3 and those of "Advocate" in another.4 Other
particular responsibilities from serving in roles as government employee' or
judge or arbitrator 6 are also recognized in the Model Rules.
One healthy way to deal with stress (per our popular psychologists) is to
analyze its causes. This issue of the Valparaiso University Law Review is
devoted to self-analysis of the legal profession and its standing in American
society. The reader interested in this issue may also be interested in Jane
Jacobs's recent analysis of the ethical systems guiding our social and economic
lives.' Entertaining enough to overcome the inherent pedantry of the format of
a Platonic dialogue, Jacobs explores two systems of values that conflict in
working life: the "commercial moral syndrome" and the "guardian moral
syndrome." While a judge is a "guardian" whose precepts prohibit the sale of
judicial services, says Jacobs:
[a] lawyer in private practice is free to accept any client she chooses
and trade her advice, knowledge, and forensic skill for a fee. A
respectable trading transaction. But as soon as that lawyer accepts an
appointment to a regulatory agency, or wins election to a legislative
post, the same kind of behavior, maybe even with one of her same old
clients, converts to criminal bribe taking!5
Thus, the private practice of law is, in Jacobs' view, an anomaly, fitting

2. "A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen
having special responsibility for the quality ofjustice." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Preamble (1994). A lawyer's responsibilities in these roles can mean:
however, [that] conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all
difficult ethical
problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal
system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while earning
a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional conduct prescribe terms for resolving
such conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules, many difficult issues of
professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of
sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the
Rules.
Id.
3. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 2.1 - 2.3 (1994).

4. Id.Rules 3.1 -3.9.
5. Id.Rule 1.11.
6. Id. Rule 1.12.
7. JANE JACOBS, SYSTEMS OF SURVIVAL:

COMMERCE AND POLITICS (1992).
8. Id.at 61.
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completely into neither the commercial nor guardian systems. 9 Is this good?
(After all, Jacobs is a philosopher.) Yes, says Jacobs:
provided the lawyer has the skills and temperament for both, and
many do. Good lawyers understand the distinctions. Of course, just
as some guardian lawyers take bribes or other private benefits-like
promises of lucrative future private employment-so do some lawyers
in private practice use adversarial tricks and cunning in what ought to
be straightforward commercial arrangements. That always makes
trouble. It also makes people distrust and hate lawyers.
The note on the Scope of the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, adopted
by the ABA House of Delegates in 1983, explains that the rules do not "exhaust
the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no
worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules."" These
unenumerated considerations apparently are at the core of the professionalism
movement.
In 1985, the American Bar Association appointed a Commission on
Professionalism as the result of a recommendation by former Chief Justice
Waren E. Burger and ABA President John C. Shepherd who both observed that
"the Bar might be moving away from the principles of professionalism and that
it was so perceived by the public."' In its conclusion, the Commission noted
that "[p]erhaps the golden age of professionalism has always been a few years
before the time that the living can remember.""
But, the Commission
concluded that "it is proper-indeed it is essential-for a profession periodically
to pause to assess where it is going and out of what traditions it has come." 4
Continuing in this spirit of professional self-assessment is the work of the
Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, described in this
issue by its chair, Judge Marvin E. Aspen. The Seventh Circuit Committee's
definition of civility in litigation as "professional conduct . . . of judicial
personnel and attorneys"" is interesting in its inclusion of judges. This
inclusion apparently resulted from the Committee's survey which found

9. Id.at 115.
10. Id.
11. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1994).
12. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM,
OF PUBULC SERVICE:"

....
IN THE SPIRIT
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM, at v

(1986).
13. Id.at 55.
14. Id.

15. Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh FederalJudicial Circuit, 143
F.R.D. 371, 378 n.1 (1991).
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dissatisfactions among both the Bench and the Bar with each other. Judge
Aspen believes that it is simplistic to attribute civility problems in litigation to
changes in our society and examines a variety of causal factors, some of which
may be more pronounced-for now-in a large metropolitan area. Clearly, the
Seventh Circuit has blazed a trail that others are following.
Dean Edward McGlynn Gaffney pursues the cautions to judges in the
Seventh Circuit's Standards to an "imperative of judicial civility."
He
illuminates the early post-Revolutionary period when, still in the English
tradition, dissenting opinions were not written by gentlemen. This restraint was
soon overcome, and Dean Gaffney recounts some of the great dissents and
discusses their role in American jurisprudence. He concludes that judges of
appellate courts need to exercise care in the drafting of their dissents.
Judge Aspen and Dean Gaffney have an unstated premise that was perhaps
best stated by Rodney King when he said that we're all in this together. Perhaps
that is the origin of the call for civility-otherwise known as the Golden Rule.
Justice Brent E. Dickson and Julia Bunton Jackson describe efforts on the
part of the Bench and the Bar nationwide to promote lawyer civility. These
efforts include committees and commissions, court decisions and rules,
programs, publications, oaths, and creeds. Especially noteworthy is the
American Inns of Court movement that addresses two frequently identified
causes of incivility, lack of collegiality and of mentoring.
John C. Buchanan explores the symptoms of the demise of the profession's
standing in the public's eyes and proposes a society of lawyers committed to
standards of professionalism. This fascinating concept reflects a phenomenon
of fairly recent vintage. While it is unlikely that lawyers and judges have
succumbed to general societal influences such as media portrayals of violence,
it is true that the professions have become more overtly competitive in the past
fifteen years. An organization, such as Mr. Buchanan proposes, might carve a
niche based on such standards in the market for legal services. Clearly, not
only the profession, but the consumers of legal services are seeking alternatives.
Professor Amy R. Mashburn presents a provocative challenge to discussions
of professionalism and civility with the thesis that they are class-based and
biased to the views of large firms. Professor Mashburn suggests that such
efforts divert attention from problems such as failures of the attorney regulatory
and disciplinary systems.
Professor Burnele V. Powell posits a transformation in the lawyer
regulatory and disciplinary systems to a consumer orientation, heralded on by
the work of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss2/11

Devlin: Profesionalism in the Practice of Law: A Symposium on Civility an

1994]

FOREWORD

(McKay Commission). Notable in this transformation are recommendations for
reassertion of the judiciary's direct control over and public accountability of
lawyer discipline systems, consumer-friendly mechanisms such as a central
intake office for complaints, and lawyer-friendly mechanisms to assist those in
trouble.
Dealing with the enforcement of judicial ethics, Professor Les Abramson
analyzes how recusal motions are dealt with in the various states. Can the judge
decide or should the motion be considered by another judge? As with lawyer
disciplinary systems, the identity of the decision-maker is crucial to the
perceived integrity of the process.
Dean Howard T. Markey, former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit,
proposes mandatory continuing education courses for judges in judicial ethics.
I respectfully suggest that legal ethics topics be included in ethics courses for
judges to keep them apprised of this developing area of the law and able to
address conduct in their courtrooms.
Here is the assessment of Alexis de Tocqueville of the American legal
profession in the 1830s:
If I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I should
reply, without hesitation, that it is not among the rich who are united
by no common tie, but that it occupies the judicial bench and the bar.
The more we reflect upon all that occurs in the United States, the
more shall we be persuaded that the lawyers, as a body, form the most
powerful, if not the only counterpoise to the democratic element ....
[Lawyers] secretly oppose their aristocratic propensities to the nation's
democratic instincts, their superstitious attachment to what is old to its
love of novelty, their narrow views to its immense designs, and their
habitual procrastination to its ardent impatience. 6
This was written just as almost all educational requirements for admission to the
Bar were eliminated, and bar organizations disappeared in the excesses of
Jacksonian democracy.' 7 But even with more stringent Bar requirements
today, de Tocqueville's comments serve as a cogent indictment of modem
professionalism. Lawyers should be aware of these criticisms and join the
movement toward professionalism.

16. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEvILLE, DEMoCRACY IN AMERICA 125 (Richard D. Heffner ed., 1984).

17. See POUND, supra note 1, at 223-49.
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